How Did John F. Kennedy Act Through the Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 brought the b on the whole to the brink of atomic war. What was at stake in the crisis, and how do you assess electric chair Kennedys response to Khrushchevs excitation? Was Kennedy prudent or rash, suitably strong-armer or needlessly aggressive? By Jeremy Leung 299722 USA & The earthly concern 131-236 The Cuban rocket Crisis was perhaps the walk-to(pre no.inal) that humankind had ever become to experiencing a thermonuclear war. In October 1962, the foundation watched perilously, as U. S. president John F. Kennedy warned his population of the amalgamation of Soviet mail in Cuba. John F.Kennedy ref single-valued functiond to accept offensive Soviet artillery in such(prenominal) close proximity to the U. S. , further Soviet chairman Nikita Khrushchev had already planned a stealthily build-up. Kennedy henceforth demanded Khrushchev to disassemble offensive artillery and employed a strict naval isolate, an action that Khrushchev initi comp letelyy refused and deemed abominable. For several days, as twain of the worlds superpowers refused to meet an agreement, the world faced the daunting and horrifying prospect of a nuclear war. Eventually, Khrushchev had accepted a pacific resolution, as he withdrew Soviet offensive fortify in return for a promise that the U.S. would non invade Cuba. With the Soviet exodus from Cuba, president Kennedys popularity had risen sharp as journalists labelled him the architect of a great diplomatic victory. 1 Kennedys ability to remain calm under the pressure of a voltage nuclear war had won praise from his colleagues and the the Statesn public, who rewarded him with re-election. In a diametrically opposed stead, conservatives assert his actions were non decisive enough in securing the Statess national auspices. This essay will seek to essay both the praise and the criticism in evaluating John F.Kennedys actions done with(predicate) the peaceful resolution of the Cuban rocket Crisis. For m whatever Americans, the Cuban projectile Crisis, and in particular the build-up of Soviet arms at bottom Cuba represented a clock in which their national security and safety was at stake. This build-up of Soviet missiles in Cuba was deemed by the media as an action aimed to inflicting an almost mortal shock on us2. This impending flagellum was dealt with such severity that a committee was formed that comprised of U. S. government officials who were to advise professorship John F.Kennedy on alpha matters. As a senior member of the committee, which was known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm), Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillion remarked The crisis was bizarre in the sense that it was the low time that in that location was a real, imminent, emf nemesis to the physical safety and well being of American citizens. 3 This ceremony from Dillon portrays the fear that much of the American public felt, who taught and prepared their ch ildren through with(predicate) schools to dunk and cover in the event of a nuclear war. 4 Yet, it appeared at the time that the build-up of arms within Cuba was not only a confrontation to the U. S. , but a direct threat to national security that was felt and feared by both the public and leading politicians. To substantiate this, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara recalled on the 27th October, As I left the white house and walked through my garden to my car to return to the pentagon on the beautiful fall evening, I feared I might never live to see another Saturday nighttime. 5 In profit to this, Robert Kennedy wrote afterwards that the world was brought to the abyss of nuclear remainder and the end of mankind. 6 Both these accounts demonstrate the extreme severity in which Congress perceived the Soviet threat. On the 26th of September, U. S. Congress voted strongly in favour to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the s ecurity of the United States with a 386-7 majority in the House of Representatives, and an 86-1 majority in the Senate. 7 This represents an overwhelming view in both houses of the U. S. Congress that action needed to be taken upon the build-up of nuclear arms in Cuba. The reasons why McNamara and Kennedy and other U. S. politicians were so cowardly of a nuclear was because according to U. S. analysts at the time, the 24 MRBMs (Medium range-ballistic missiles) and sixteen IRBMs (intermediate-range ballistic missiles) that were found in Cuba had significantly increased the add up of U. S. targets that the Soviets could lethally approach by forty percent. 8 Furtherto a greater extent, having missiles within Cuba allowed the Soviets to revolve the U. S. warning radars, especially the Ballistics rocket Early Warning system, which was stationed in the North Pole. 9 By bypassing the U. S. warning radars, it originally amplified the risk of a ramp strike upon certain American air b ases and important command posts. 10 To squall this risk, the U. S. army went from Defence Condition Five (peacetime alert) to Defcon 3 (war alert) which further illustrated the senior high levels of precautions the U.S. government were taking in order to protect itself from an offensive attack from the Soviet. 11 It was quite clear from these precautions that the impending nuclear threat in Cuba exist the lives of American civilians, troops, and government officials. In the event that the situation escalated out of control, the two world superpowers could wear engaged in a tertiary World War that, with nuclear technology had the capableness to kill hundreds of millions of civilians and soldiers. 12 Fortunately, the Cuban armorial bearing Crisis never escalated this far, as Kennedy maintained control of the situation and eventually caused the Soviets to retreat. Kennedys actions in peace fullyy resolving the Cuban rocket Crisis demonstrated responsibility and purposefulness , which overall had confirmed public confidence in the President. In the first ExComm meeting, manifest was presented of medium-range missiles in Cuba that had the potential to hit Washington, Dallas, St. Louis, and all Strategic Air Command bases in between. 13 Soon after, further demonstration was presented to ExComm of the development of 1,000-mile medium-range ballistic missiles and 2,200 mile intermediate-range ballistic missiles. It was alike predicted by the experts presenting this evidence that forty nuclear warheads had the capacity to hit targets as far as Wyoming and Montana. 14 Robert Kennedy had predicted that these arms had the power and potential to kill as many as eighty million Americans. 15 President John F. Kennedy was faced with two important options to implement a naval blockade, or to invade Cuba beginning with an air-strike. 16 Kennedy heady upon enforcing a naval quarantine in Cuba, which was later labelled by Khrushchev as outright banditry and an action that would push mankind to the abyss of a world missile nuclear war. 17 The quarantine was a first step that involved confiscating all offensive military equipment that was being shipped to Cuba. If, in the event Khrushchev refused to remove Soviet missiles, John F. Kennedy promised further action would be taken. 18 As the leaders of the two superpowers stood eyeball to eyeball, and the world b passaged itself for a possibility for a thermonuclear war, Khrushchev had agreed to ithdrawal weapons that Kennedy had deemed offensive, while Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba. 19 The U. S. response, in the form of a blockade was a sharp-witted choice as it applied the greatest level of force upon the Soviet Union while minimizing the risk of a thermonuclear war. Traditionalists, supported to this choice. Traditionalists abduce to the individuals who advocated the traditional interpretation, and were coincidentally the individuals who wrote the most content during Cuban missile Crisis. 20 Sorensen, a traditionalist, who was also an advisor to Kennedy, believed that Kennedy responded superbly to the crisis, as he conducted himself in a responsible and composed matter throughout his confrontation with Khrushchev. 21 Sorensen believed that this was perhaps the Presidents finest hour, as he never lost sight of what each war or surrender would do to the whole human race And he was determined to take all necessary action and no unnecessary action. 22 Sorensen also noted the fact that Kennedy had not estimable national interests in mind but, civilians in other countries.Sorensen named this the Kennedy Legacy which he defined as a pervasive sense of responsibility for the future of our children for those who live in the country and those who live in other lands. 23 It appeared that through Sorensens recount of the events leading up to the peaceful resolution of the Cuban projectile crisis show admiration for Kennedys actions, as he believed Kennedy remained in control of events, despite being constantly provoked by Khrushchev. Sorensen also highlighted the Presidents poise in the confrontation, as he refused the temptation of making a reckless decision to attack Cuba and thus start a nuclear war.Like Sorensen, Robert Kennedy described every American, in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, as feeling a sense of pride in the strength, purposefulness and the courage of the President of the United States. 24 Furthermore, McGeorge Bundy, another traditionalist member of Excomm, praised President Kennedy for his personal management of the nuclear confrontation. 25 Similarly to Bobby Kennedy and Sorensen, Bundy acknowledged, and commended the Presidents strength, rampart and respect for the opinions of mankind. 26 It is quite clear through these personal recounts of Bundy, Sorensen, and Kennedy, that there was a consistent view across Excomm and the traditionalists that President John F. Kennedy demonstrated decisiveness, intelligence, and beni gnity while seeking to mitigate the risk of war by causing Khrushchev to compromise. These traits were also seen by the American public with public opinion commendation ratings increasing to eighty percent after the crisis, as journalists compared him to past heroes such as Wilson and Roosevelt. 27 Overall, President Kennedys actions within the Cuban Missile Crisis not only led to great respect by his colleagues and the public, but more importantly reduced Cold War tensions between Russia and the U. S. A. This was evident in the aftermath of the Cold War that saw an installation of a telephone link that allowed direct communication between Russian and American leaders, along with the signing of a nuclear test ban treaty which endorsed a harmonious coexistence between the two superpowers. 28Within the waves of praise towards the United States President for his transactions with the Soviets, there were also few individuals who voiced their concerns over certain decisions Kennedy mad e. Following questionable decisions by Kennedy that led to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the U. S. policy within Cuba only consisted of diplomatic and economic means, and only until later were trade restrictions forced. Thus, for a period of two years leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, John F. Kennedy allowed the Soviets amalgamate a significant descend of arms provided they were defensive. Using this word defensive, the American President was justifying and legitimizing the build-up of arms in the backyard of the U. S, as it allowed Cuba to asseverate itself as the hemispheres third largest military authority. 29 By Kennedys failure to initiate an intrusion upon Cubas burgeoning military at an early, yet critical point, it communicated to the Soviets that there was possibility for them to upset the balance of power within any country, as long as they were granted authorization by local governments.By not invading Cuba, the Soviets and Cubans proceeded to integrate armed forces tha t had the potential to cause serious damage upon Western civilization, power and influence. In addition to failing to stop the military build-up in Cuba, there was also line in Kennedys decision to implement a naval quarantine in Cuba. Kennedys choice to quarantine, rather than imposing a full air-strike upon Cuba had its weakness. At this critical point within the Cuban Missile Crisis, this provided the U. S. n opportunity to impose a severe defeat upon its enemy. The moment of crisis, the threat of communism, along with the risk of perhaps disruptive world peace all suggested that Kennedy could rescue caused a decisive answer to the problems escalating in Cuba. Kennedys government, alternatively of quarantining Cuba from naval imports, could go forcibly demanded the departure of Russians, along with their weapons within Cuba altogether. 30 This would have not only eliminated Russian threat within close proximity to the U.S, but could have also provided the Cuban people with a representative republic that consisted of free elections under UN supervision. 31 Kennedy sort of, elected for a naval blockade, which could have potentially left open a possibility for the Soviets to import arms via the air. In addition to this, the blockade failed to give the U. S. any assurance or certainty that the Soviets would retreat from Cuba. If, however, Kennedy elected for an invasion and demanded Khrushchev to leave, it would have eliminated all doubt of a Soviet retreat and ensured the protection of Americas national security.Overall, throughout the Cuban Missile Crisis, the world sit perilously as the two superpowers engaged in a confrontational battle that had the potential to escalate into a possible third world war with overwhelmingly destructive consequences. In two world wars, millions of people were slaughtered in battles that continued over years however it was possible, with the advent of nuclear technology that hundreds of millions of civilians and soldiers c ould die within hours. 32 Khrushchev continued to use Soviet resources to hoard a large missile base within Cuba in Americas backyard, which called for President John F. Kennedy to act and protect the national security of the U. S. In deciding on implementing a naval quarantine approximately Cuba, Kennedy avoided an airstrike and possible invasion, by giving his opponent time to reassess his actions. finished constant pressure from Khrushchev, Kennedy stood decisive and resolute, as he resisted the temptation of gambol with the safety of the world and continued to monitor the sea and intercept queer naval activity around Cuba.Kennedy proceeded and continued to implement the blockade, which was clearly an undertake to avoid any direct military means, by providing Khrushchev with a threat of danger, yet also allowing him with the option to retreat. Although this was seen as weak from conservatives, it is important that Kennedy of all time continued to pressure his Soviet counter part whenever he sensed scruple or deception. 33 Kennedy never wielded from his objective, as he forced a peaceful resolution that left his colleagues in awe of his poise and determination dealing with such a crisis.Thus, by Kennedy reacting in a suitably tough fashion, Khruschev provided the U. S. President with the ultimate accolade that if he had been in the White House, instead of the Kremlin, he would have acted like Kennedy. 34 Words 2562 Bibliography Primary Resources Blight, mob & Welch, David. Cuba on the bank Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse. juvenile York Pantheon Books, 1993. Bundy, McGeorge. endangerment and Survival Choices about the conk out in the first fifty years. New York Random House, 1988 Bundy, McGeorge. The Presidency and the ataraxis, Foreign Affairs 42 (1964).Kennedy, Robert. Thirteen Days A register of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York W. W. Norton, 1969 Lowenthal, David. U. S. Cuban Policy Illusion and human race, National Revie w (1963) McNamara, Robert. Blundering into Disaster Surviving the First deoxycytidine monophosphate of the atomic Age. London Bloomsbury 1987 Munton, Don & Welch, David. A. The Cuban Missile Crisis. New York Oxford University Press, 1988. Sorensen, Theodore. Kennedy. New York MacMillan, 1969. Sorensen, Theodore. The Kennedy Legacy. New York Harper and Row, 1965 Secondary Resources Divine, Robert A.The Cuban Missile Crisis. Chicago Quadrangle Books, 1971. Garthoff, Raymond. The consequence of the Missiles. Washington Quarterly 5 (1982), 78 Horelick, Arnold. The Cuban Missile Crisis An abstract of Soviet calculations and behaviour. World Politics (1964) Medland, William. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 Needless or Necessary. New York Praeger Publishers,, 1988. Scott, Len. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Threat of Nuclear War. London Continuum Books, 2007. 1Robert Divine, The Cuban Missile Crisis, (Toronto Burns and MacEachern1971), 4. 2 David Lowenthal, US Cuban Policy Illusion and cosmos, National Review, 29 January 1963, 63, quoted in Arnold L. Horelick, The Cuban Missile Crisis An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behaviour, World Politics 16/3 (April 1963), 64 3 James Blight & David Welch, Cuba on the Brink Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse (New York Pantheon Books, 1993), 163 4 Len Scott, The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Threat of Nuclear War (London Continuum Books, 2007), 48. 5 Robert McNamara, Blundering into Diaster Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age (London Bloomsbury, 1987), 11. 6 Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days, The Cuban Missile Crisis (London Pan Books, 1969), 27. 7 McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival Choices about the Bomb in the first fifty years (New York Random House, 1988), 391. 8 Raymond Garthoff, Memo on the Military Significance of the Soviet Missiles Bases in Cuba, October 27, 1962. Department of State declassifified document, reprinted in Garthoff, The Meaning of the Missiles, Washington Quarterly 5, n o. 4 (Autumn 1982), 78 9 Scott, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 48. 10 ib. 48 11 Divine, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 61. 12 Don Munton and David A. Welch, The Cuban Missile Crisis (Oxford University Press New York, 2007), 1. 13 William J. Medland The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 Needless or Necessary (Praeger Publishers New York, 1988), 4. 14 Ibid, 5. 15 Divine, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 28. 16 Ibid, 28 17 Medland, Needless or Necessary, 38. 18 Divine, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 61 19 Munton and Welch The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1. 20 Divine, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 35 21 Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York Harper and Row, 1965 paperback ed. New York petite Books, 1966, 795. 22 Ibid, 795. 23 Theodore C. Sorensen, The Kennedy Legacy (New York Macmillan, 1969), 274. 24 Kennedy, Thirteen days, 67. 25 McGeorge, Bundy, The Presidency and the Peace, Foreign Affairs 42 (April 1964) 353-365 26 Ibid. , 359 27 Divine, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 58. 28 Medland, Needless or Necessary, 56. 29 Lowent hal, US Cuban Policy, 61. 30 Divine, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 91. 31 Ibid, 93. 32 Munton and Welch The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1. 33 Divine, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 101. 34 Ibid, 104